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For those \\ ho worl-.. in higher education instillitions around the world, the launch on the Internet of the lirst comprehensive set of global university rankings by the Shanghai Jiao Tong University Institute of Higher Education in China (SJTUIHE) on 28 June 200J was another one of these momentous events. Some grasped the signilicance of the .fiao Tong a'> soon as it appeared. Others became aware of it only as it began to reshape perceptions and behaviours ands the effects flowed back into their own nations and institutions. In that moment in June 2003 a credible world-wide hierarchy of research universities was created, in the form of the league tabks that governed sporting competitions around the world. It was instantly understood and immediately ~eductive. It seemed that the arcane and archaic world ofuni\ersities had been opened to everybody's scrutiny. The familiar spectacle of a league table of universities was readily translated into imaginings of a global university market. It locked into the world of cultural prestige and social status embodied in the leading institutions; it seemed to bring them to account, even to democrati"e them, as market consumption always does; and it was a potent technology for strategies and policies premised on the struggle for advantage. The Jiao Tong ranking felt right.
It titted with what peopk knew. Harvard was on top Il1110wed by the three leading universities in California. Stanford, Caltech and Berkeley, Cambridge in the UK was next. then \tlT and research universities from the USA, UK and other nations ranging all the v,'ay down to Ilumher 500 in the world. Everyone disavowed the exercise and pooh-poohed the measures and everyone wanted to know where their own university sat in the hierarchy and ht1\\ close they were to greatness. It was irresistihle.
Though lists of leading universities had appeared before. they were lIsuall) based on surveys of reputation. The results were of passing interest. a c(lnglorneration of opinions that told people nothing ahout the fundamentals of relative performanee or quality. The Jiao Tong was more compelling than its predeeessors. It sprang 1"0111 social science techniques that originated in census-style sociology and modeb of economic outputs rather than suhjcctive market research. It measured the re81 activit) of universities and in a manner that was eornprehensihle. There was a medium degree of complexity in the methodology of data processing leading to a single ordinal numher tor each university at the end. The Shanghai Jiao Tong llniversit) Institute also made several moves that grounded its' Academic Ranking of World Universities' effectively and in a lasting manner. It measured rcsearch performance in several ways. Many people immediately disputed the measures and their inter pretation (and many still do) hut it was difficult to dismiss all or the measures.
The data were transparent and the sources were known: Nohel Prize winners, the identity of leading researchers hy citation, lhe Ilumher and quality of citations and publications (SHUI HE, 2008) .1 The data sources could not he directly manipulated hy the universities themselves or hy national governments with a vested interest in 'their' university performance. The Shanghai Jiao Tong team soon made it clear that they were willing to fine-tune the rankings on the basis of valid proposals for more accurate measures and they were utterly uninterested in special pleading. The Jiao Tong ranking withstood all attempts to discredit it and h) 2005 it was thoroughly entrenched.
It was a remarkable achievement. A top ten university in China. an emerging rather than estahlished system of research universities. relativised every university in the world including those located in the dominant country, the liSA. and so defined the global university market.
So the age of glohal university rankings was born and higher education was normalised as a single global competition of research universities, one system crossing every border: and as a quasi-market competition for status. for gifted and creative people and for resources on a worldwide scale. Half a decade later it is apparent that global research rankings are shaping and normalising worldwide higher education in much the same way that the annual rankings hy the liS :--Jews and World report have shaped American higher education since the 1920s. Since 2003 global rankings have fed into the accelerating 'arms race' in investments in innovation; and. in synchrony with the evolution of knowledge-intensive production, the glohalisation of communications and the continuing advance of education. have helped to shift the idea of the 'glohal knowledge economy' from the edges of mainstream economic policy to the centre of governmcnt thinking around the world. It seems that the global knowledge economy (and higher education and research along with it) have become the holy graiL the lInrealisahle essence at the heart of policy. A natioll, or a meta-national region stich as the FU. cannot have enough knowledge power. In a world of tinite resources. knowledge is inlinitely e:-cpanding and increasingly it is st.:en as the key to comparative advantage. It st.:ems that the knowlt.:dge economy will guarantee the future and will meet all ollr needs. Growth. Wealth. Climate control. National success. Freedol1l. the brilliance of the human spirit the triumph of the will. etc. University rankings give form to tht.: idea of the glohal kf1(l\\ ledge economy. especially the basic research aspect of it. They show go\ernments and multinational husiness firms where knowledge power lies and lock universities lirmly into the political economy.
Global university rankings have their critics and some have powerful and convincing arguments. Aller all it is preposterolls to squeeze the vast diversity of higher education acro~s the world. with its rich and remarkahle range of approaches. systems. languages and creative products. into a single vertical table hased on one vector of value which is North American style scientific research. It is like reducing the novels of Tolstoy to 30-second sound bites or squeezing the library of Alexandria into a toothpaste tube. '\0 ranking system can satisfy everyone in its coverage (for a start. tt.:aching performance is outside all of them at present) and the tirst Jiao Tong nlnkings have already spawned a diversity of mutations and metrics. There arc fe\~ outright winners and many losers in a league table. On the face of it. rankings ought to be wildly unpopular. But the rankings juggernaut rolls all. For the ti.lrcseeablt.: future it is unstoppable hecause it meets the political. economic and cultural needs of the til11t.:s. It provides substance tix external pressures fix accountahility and performance and the rubrics of community and industry engagement. It feeds into the global student market. into the marketing pitch of institutions and the choice-making of prospective students. Pre-eminently global. it has the attraction of all one-stop 'best in tile world' summaries that. in our hubris. make the planet appear smaller and more controllable. Spectators at worldwide contt.:sts have po\Ver of a sort. at least to themsdves. the power of opinion over what they see. The capacity to que.~tion the rankings is part of the charm they exert. And the thrill of winners and losers on this scale is popularly and deeply compelling, like the stories in history of the rise and fall of empires.
The pre-rankings era in higher education now appears as an age of pristine innocence. populated by beings of refined sensibilities that \Vere oblivious to their looming fate. like the aesthetic cultures of the tin-de-sieck European cities before the onslaught of the lirst world war. The university ranking process is not fixed in stone. As Heraclitus said. everything is always becoming. University rankings \vill change in futun: and they will change according to conscious design; they may becomt.: grt.:atly pluralised and the competitive edge of any particular league table might bt.: blunl!..'d. But fi.)r good or ill global ranking~ are here to stay; and higher education and rt.:st.:arch glohal. national and local -will never he Ihe same again.
I"his chaptt.:r considers the origin~. workings and policy effects of university rankings. It concludes with discussion of the jUllction between university rankings, university govt.:rnance and systems of power at micro and macro I!..'vcls. and it rellects on the global ordt.:ring of higher education that rankings !..'ntail. ;\ piec!..' of seholarship of this length cannot do justice to what is already a vast subject in the national and global literaturt.:s but there are other sumll1ative accounts. surveys. In one sense. university ranking has no origin. Concentrations of know ledge power <lnd status long pre-date modernity and are found at the beginnings of urban cultures and incipient states. Most civilisations had their leading temple", churche" and centres of learning. Philosophers' schools were vigorously set against each other in Athens and Rome. In another sense. present university ranking ha;, several origins. Being still in its early st<lges at the global level. ranking continues to be the subject of heterogeneous invention and has yet to settle into predictable s} stems fl)r managing human exchange in the manner of: say. transport or the financial sectors, But a key precursor of the present development of global univcrsity ran"ing is the annllal survey of American higher education by the US News and World Report. 
US Neil'S (lild World Rel)Ori
The annual US News and World Report ranking began in the 1920s, It I(KUSe" principally on aspects of institutions seen to contribute to the qualit) of teaching and the student experience. thereby servicing the voucher style national student market which is underpinned by government-backed loans and lIniver:-.ity tuition scholarships. Research plays a minor role. There is not one ranking but se\eral. sorted by institutional mission, Llsing the elassitication system devi~ed b~ the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, The leading grouping is the 'National Universities'. 248 universities (162 public and 86 private) \\ ilh a range of tields of study, oftering to doc\()ral 11..' \1..' 1 and mostly researeh intensive (Kirp. 2003. p. 12) .
In the category of National Universities. 25 per cent of the index is comprised by a survey of 'undergraduate academic excellence' sent to university presidents. provosts and deans of admissions, Two items each constitute 20 per cent: student retention and graduation rates: and 'taculty resources' which rewards ~l1lall classe". high academic salaries. high academic qualifications and a high proportion of staff full-lime, Student selcctivit} at entry. a proxy tl)r positional status, is 15 per cent. rhe lesser ikms are spending pa student (10 per cent), the proportioll of alumni \\ho donnte to the institution (5 per cent), and the graduation rate aller controlling for spcnding ami student aptitude (5 per cent). The US News ranking is managed b) a commercial publisher whose only Illotivl.: is to sell magazilles. Except for its annual goldll1ine, its special edition on 'America's best schools and colleges', LS \iews is 'otherwise little-noticed' (Kirp, 2003, p. 25) . Its categories and its ~tatistical modelling are questioned, the combination of the elements into a single index number is un-theorised and arbitrary, and it is open to institutional lobbying and data manipulation. Nevertheless US News has I.:aptured the role of superintl.:ndent of higher education in the public interest. More than any other factor this much publicised annual ranking has shaped the discourses and technologies (though not the political economy, which has other ft)undations) of American higher education as a national market.
University President~ can live and die on the basis of fluctuations in their US News position and over the years it has come to prolc)Lmdly anel.:t institutional behaviours. There is much at stake in the ran kings exercise .. With each step upwards in thl.: rankings, proporti,)nately more of the students a college accepts, and more of those with high SAl scores, deeide to enrol' (Kirp, 2003, p. Universities and colleges have learned 10 modify themsl.:lves so as to maximise their US News position. Since the rate or alumni giving leeds into the US News rankings, some colleges diminate from their data base graduates they know will not donate. 'Admissions ofticl.:rs encourage as many students as possible to apply. knowing that the more applicants that a college rejects, the more selective it appears to be' (Kirp. 200]. p. 2526). Some schools place their best applicants on a wait-list knowing that they will Iwt eome anyway. and wanting to appl.:ar more selective. Institutions reduce the size of their initial intake so that refusal rates are ratcheted up and they can claim greater sdeetivity, letting in other students later as a supple mentary cohort. More seriously. a growing proportion of student aid has been shifted from needs-based schemcs designed to encourage students from social groups undcr-represented in higher education, to merit-based schemes targeting students with high SAT scores (Kirp, 2003, pp. 61-62) . Thus rankings nominally designed IlX the public good have undermined it. There is a warning here. The US News e.\perience suggests the possibility that the fostering of market subjectivities at the global levl.:!. via university ranking systems, has the potential to encourage bcl1<l\ iOllrs that undermine the global public good (Marginson. 2007a ).
The .!ial! Tong
The Jiao 'Tong ranking was specifically created to service China's national policy. The conventional World Bank recipe for emerging nations is to build primary, secondary and tertiary education in that order. The government of China knew that in future it would need to make a transition from the medium technology manunlcturing economy that was generating phenomenal rates of economic growth based on cheap labour from the countryside, to a knowledge-intensive services economy hased on high educational levels. It opted for a radically different recipe to the conventional (Jne. based on a more immediate transition to higher le\els of skill without going through the World Bank's stages of economic development. It set itself the goal ofil11mediately forming a modernised tertiary education system at OECD levels of participation. the rapid expansion of R& D and the creation of a system of world-class research universities. Where does the Shanghai .fian Tong University exercise til into this picture? The global comparisons of university research performance collected by the Institute of Higher Education at Shanghai Jiao Tong University \vere launched as a nationall)· supported project designed to shmv China exactly where its rescarch-intensh e universities were at and to guide inve~tments in the universities. The ranh.ing system was not designed to t~lVour Chinese universities and build global reputation on an artificial basis. The intention was to monitor the gap in research perft)fJiiance between China and universities in North America. the UK and \Vestern Europe. according to an international benchmark that was based on the American model of the comprehensive research-intensive science university. This was seen as the global standard. the mark of the world leading knowledge-led economy that China wanted to be. It was therefore vital li'om the start to conduct the comparati\ e exercise as precisely as possible. The Jiao Tong group argued then and continues to state that the only data sufficiently reliable for ranking purposes are broadl) available and internationally comparable data of measurable research pertt)J"]llance (Liu & Cheng. 2005 . p. LB.) This is measured using a compositc index with weights given to the di fferent criteria. The index is primarily driven by academic publication and citation. mostly in science-based disciplines with some attention to social sciences and humanities There is still far to go to achieve the ultimate objectives. As yet thcre are no universities 11'0111 China in the world's top 100 research institutions. The 2008 rankings by discipline found that China had only ten universities with top 100 disciplines. compared to 308 in the USA, 50 in the UK, 26 in Canada and 20 in Germany. HO\\'e\er thcre were nine Engineering schools in China in this category. second highest level in the world after 49 such schools in the United States (SJTlIIIIE. 2008). The long climb to parity with the USA has begun and the Jiao rong ml1king~ will measure each height as it is reached. Other national governments arc also using the .liao Tong to drive improvements in research performance.
The Tillie's flight'r Rilnking
The annual Times Higher Education Supplement ranking is a dilTerent story. Rupert \1urdoeh's Times dccided that a handful of social scientists and ex engineers at China's ninth ranked universit) were not going to set the frame of the world market and, just over one year alter the first J iao Tong ranking was issued, they produced a very different global ranking. onc closer to the methodology of the US ~ew~ and World Report Ih<1n that of the Jiao Tong. Like US News. the ultimate purpose was to sell newsmagazines and the focus was 011 factors that might drive student choice-making between institutions. A secondary purpose might be interred from the outcome of the exercise, which was to elevate the global position of British universities. or at least to elevate criteria f()r comparison and mcthodologies of comparison which benefited those institutions.
The Time~ Higher ranking has undergone a long succession of changes in data collection and compilation but the broad approach has remained consistent. Like Shanghai Jiao Tong University, it uses a composite index. Unlike the Jiao Tong. it captures a broader group of phenomena than those solely related to research. Half the index is grounded in reputation, 40 per cent comprised by a survey of academics (' peer review') and 10 per cent by a survey of ' global employers'. There are two inlernationalisation indicators: the proportion of students who are international (5 per cent) and the proportion of staff(5 per cent). Another :!O per cent is Ilxed b~ the student-staff ratio. a quantity measure intended as proxy li)r teaching 'qual it~ '. The other :!O per cent is comprised by research citation perltlflllHIlCe per academic staff. The Times issues an annual list of the top 20() univer~ities in order. plus rankings by institution in natural sciences. engineering and IT. biomedicinc. social science and arts/humanities (Times Higher. 2008) .
Like the Jiao Tong rank ings. the annual Times Higher rankings arc widely publicised each year and successful universities make ll1uch use of the rankings position in their marketing campaigns. But the proces" of data collection. which is handled by a marketing company that uses market research techniques that dl) not pass social science tests. is less rigorous than at Shanghai .Iian Tong University. For example in 2006 the survey of academic 'peers' gathered a response orillst I per cent from 200.000 e-mails sent worldwide. The pool of n:sponses \'vas weighted towards the UK and fonner countries of the British Empire where The Times was well known. such as Australia. New Zealand. Hong Kong. Singapore and Malaysia. Rates of return Irol11 Europe and the USA were signi ticantly lower. The returns were not re-weighted to correct tor this compositional bias. There are other problems with the Times Higher approach. Arguably. teaching quality cannot be assessed lIsing student-staff ratios. Resourcing is one condition of teaching qual it} but it does not guarantee it. Research is only 20 per cent of the index. \\ hieh might be appropriate to the global commercial market in degrees. but arguabl: is not the way that most of the world values 'best universities'. The student international isation indicator rewards an institution for student volullle without accollnting It)r the quality or quantity of applications. It ft)ellSeS on the capacity to generate global revenue as 3n end in itself rather than 'best university' global quality. Again. this makes sense in commercial terms. The Times Higher ranking rewards a lIni\crsit~ 's marketing division better than its researchers.
The outcome is a conglomerate league table. It elevates the stellar uni,ersities in the USA and UK via the reputational and research indicators. It picks up the best known institutions in national systems especially those located in national capitals. via the reputation indicators. Thus the leading Chinese universities do better in the Times Higher than the Jiao Tong. The rcputational indicators and international isation indicators are also aft~eted by the intensive cross-border marketing or some Australian and UK universities. The result is a less enherent order in \\hidl the hierarchy of research universities is under-determined by the hierarch: of universities providing mass education in the commercial cross-horder market. Below the top 40 places the Times Higher ranking has also proven to he highly volatile. Institutions undergo sharp rises and/or falls and a university markets itsel r on the hasis of its These huge fluctuations are not pert()rmance related. They are principally random effects triggered by weaknesses in data gathering and changes in data collation methods. Over time this has tended to undermine the credibility of the rankings.
The Times Higher ranking also generates less random effects that are integral to the pol itical economy of the exercise. Rellecting the composition bias in the peer survey and the tocus of the indicators on factors germane to the global market in degrees. the llK and Australian institutions perform rather too well. The UK has just 15 per cent of the (iDP of the tlSA but the UK has almost halfas many universities as the lJSA in the Times top 100 in 2006: LJ K 15. LSA JJ. Thus the Times manages to reduce American global dominance from 54 research universities in the Jiao Tong ranking to just 33 in its own league table. The individual po"itions of the British universities are higher also. In 2006 the UK had two of the Times Higher top three and Cambridge UK had almost closed the gap on Ilarvard. Yet the Harvard taculty is cited at three and a half times the rate of Cambridge and has far greater world-wide prestige. Further. Australian universities tend to perform exceptionally well in the peer survey of academic statl and in the student inter nationalisation indicator. In 2006 the Au~tralian 'ational University was ranked by the Times 'academic peers' ahead of Yale. Princeton. Cal tech. Chicago. U Penn and l'CI.A. Despite a relatively poor citation rate and mocil.:rate staffing ratios. Australia had 13 of the Times top 200 universities. making it the third strongest national system. ahead of Japan. Canada. Germnny and France. This makes sense in relation to the glohal degree market but not total performance or global university standing.
The CIIE Comparisons in Germany
The Centre for Higher Education Development (ClIE). located in Gutersloh in North Rhine-Westphalia in Germany. has moved in the opposite direction. It has turned its back on the pervasive idea of higher education as a marketplace of competing tlrms. The CH E comparisons are produced in conjunction with the German Academic Exchange Service and the publisher Die Zeit and have now been replicated in other Europeiln nations. They do not use reputation-sensitive whole-of-institution league tables. and tocus on the generation of comparative data that will be of maximum useful ness to choice-mak ing students. CHE surveys 130.000 students and 16.000 staff in almost 250 institutions. collecting data on student experiences and satisfaction. and academic recommend ations on the best location~ in each tield. It focuses on 36 academic subjects each offered by a substantial number of institutions. It supplements the surveys with independent sources comprising one third of the data base. '-.Jo data are taken from institutions. CHE ranks departments according to each separate indicator of academic and service quality. assigning them to top third. middle third or bottom third of all institutions. It refuses to integrate the indicators into a single weighted indicator either for each subject or each institution. It states that there is no 'olle best university' across all areas. and 'minimal ditferences produced by random tluctuations may be misinterpreted as real differences' (CIIE. 2(06). ('HE notes also that students have heterogeneous preferences as to mission and purpose. Accordingly. the CIIE data are made available to prospective students and thc public free or charge via an interactive web-enabled database. Any person can interrogate this data basc by investigating the comparisons in their own chosen disciplines and services. thereby creating the weightings and ranking;; themselves.
By dispensing with holistic rank ordering of institutions in Icague tables. thc CHE avoids problems of arbitrary weighting and composite indicators and admit;;, l1lultiplt: purposes into the t:ol1lparison. It has partly shitted tht: nnrmati,e pOVver of the comparison proccss li'om the ranking agcncy to thc USCI' or higher edut:ation. The approach lacks the discursive potency and economic lock-in of a single league table: but arguably the data arc more inlixmative to more people. 111 Furope the approach has proven attractive to public and students. governments. and academic Savino. 20(6). The CHE data eollection has been extended to Switzerland. :\u;..tria. the "etherlands and Flanders. the Dutch-speaking portion of Belgiulll. 'The CIII ranking system i" thus well positioned to develop into a European-wide systelll' (Van der Wende. 2(07). It is a "ignitic<1nt counter-weight to those universit: ranking systems that constitute higher education as a market of competing institutions but is unlikely to displace them altogether.
Runking.\· and Goa/-Dclcl'l11il1alion
Once through the door. the logic or competition is relentless. The driving imperative imposed by global university ranking;; is to lift pertixlllance measured in nOl"m referenced terms within this global framc of reference, Increasingly. this imperati\ e is governing the behaviour of those with overarehing responsibilities fix institutions (university presidents. rectors and vice-chancellors) and national systems (ministers and officials). Ministers redouble the pressure on university leaders. Every govcrnment would like to lift its nation's capacity to compete in what is now universall: imagined as the global knowledge economy. I !ere university mnkings provide one of the tew simple clear-cut indicators of the nation's competitive position.
Ellen Hazelkorn reports on a survey of higher education leaders and managers in 41 countries. concerning the impact of league tables and ranking S} stems. She finds there is widespread concern about ranking" and also a readincs:-. to respond to them. Hazelkorn's survey finds that 58 per eent of university lenders are lInhapp} with their current institutional rank. 93 per cent want to lift their national position. 82 per cent want to lin their global position and 71 per cent want to be in the global top quartile. Almost universally. respondents testitied that 'rankings arc a critical lactor undcrpinning and informing institutional reputation' and a crucial tactor in determining student applications. though there arc varicd opinions on how crucial it is (Hazelkorn. 2008: quotes hcre and helow Irom her article. pp. 197 20 L derive 1'1'0111 interviews). It is considcred more important li.1r international students than for local students who onen utilise other sources of information. Rankings are secn as equally crucial in influencing government support and funding. and in shaping the pattern of international university partnerships. Rankings are also widel) used b: employers in recruiting graduates and by universities themselves in recruiting academic stair More than 56 per cent of Hazelkorn's respondents said that their institution had established a ft)flnal mechanism to review its ranking position and consider W<I)S and me<lns of improving it: and 63 per cent state "they have taken strategic. organisational. managerial or academic actions'. Only 8 per cent of respondents stated that they had taken no action in relation 10 rankings.
Institutional leaders confirm they take rankings seriously. embedding them within their strategic planning processes at all levels of the organisation. including Governing Authority. Senior Executive and School/College. Depending upon the institutional strategic o~jective vis-A-vis their current position. HEls (higher education institutions) use ranking metrics to guide their own goals. This Illay mean setting student and 111culty recruitment targets (e.g. specifying academic entry criteria, making conditions of appointment/promotion clearer and more transparent. appointing l\obel prize winners). indicating individual <Ieademic performance measurements research activity and peer-review puhlications. programme development). setting school/colleg.;-level targets. and/or continual benchmarking cxercises, A" one respondent stated: 'the improvement of the results has become a target in the contract between presidency and departments', while another conllrmed th.;-) have "d.;-vdop.;-d a s.;-t of internal research output indicators ... we do int.;-rnal benchmarking'.
Some HEIs have restructured departments. invested in their organisation's facilities or improvcd "awareness and expertise in the Research and Innovation Ortice·. Many HEls havc cstablished an institutional research office to collect data. monitor their p.;-rltmnancc. hctter present their own data in puhlic or other ofticial realms. and henchmark their peers' perftxmance. Others have taken a more aggressive approach. using rankings as a tool to influence not just organisational change but inlluence institutional priorities. In this respect, hoth teaching programmes and research are mentioned. Respondents spoke of using ranking ·to drive activities at un iversily. faculty and campus levels' and' ftlr internal budgeting'.
Rankings function as the meta-performancc indicator. The criteria used to determine the order of rank hecome meta-outputs that each institution is required to place on priority so that rankings begin to define 'quality'. In the world of the Jian Tong rankings. 'quality' means scientific research and Nohel Prizes rather than teaching or community building or solving local or glohal problems. According to the Times Higher 'quality' means reputation. larger staff.·student ratios. research. and international stall and students: and it is partly fostered by marketing. By shaping universit) and systcm behaviours and standardising the definitions of outputs, all the way down from the governing council/senate to the classroom and the research laboratory. ranking systems hegin to shape university mission and the halance of activity. externalising part of university identity. This shift from autonomy to heteronomy carries with it serious problems f"(x the trajectory of higher education In many countries, robbing not only institutions but national systems of part of their control over their identity and creating savage pressures to homogenise according to the model of an English-speaking science heavy univcrsity. This excludes from status or weakens the status of not only institutions focused on shorter course vocational education but most technical universities: non-comprehensive specialist institutions in medicine, engineering, business and the arts: and institutions combining a very broad range of functions and missions. so that research is a relatively small part of their contribution to thc national system. such as the leading national universities in Mexico and Argentina.
At the same time the loss of autonomy is not universal. We should be wary of claims that the sector as a whole is shackled by the abstract forces of marketisation or global norming. Rankings-driven heteronomy scarcely touches institutions at the very top whose internal life is reflected in the templates of the rankings systems. which remain masters of their identity, and who now take their place at the head of the global knowledge economy along with Google and Microsoti. It i" true that rankings technology imposes 011 the traditional elite a regime of greater trallsparenc~ in which pertt)flnance is more harried. It breaks down sOllie of the gothic l11yster,\ of the leaders. the incffable essence inherited from their clerical origins from which they used to draw much of their authority. \levertheless they have become more powerful overall. In the era of global rankings. the Ivy League. Cambridge and Oxford cut stronger figures in the world. amid a more vertically di fleremiated network of universities in which the number of elite universities has !',hrunk. On the other hand. outside the USA and UK. the status of elite institutions at the national level is partly displaced by the global super-league at the top of the t<1blcs. and major public or national universities are lacing downward pressures in the US as elsewhere (Calhoun. 2006).
Since the Jiao Tong hegan in 2003. rankings have strengthened support in government t()r increased investment in university research and the concentration of research resources in leading universities. sometimes at the e.xpense of other institutions and sometimes not. in order to lift the rankings position. China's policy has already been mentioned. Germany is investing 1.9 billion euros in the Exzellenzinitiative program. initially in three lIniversitie,,_ and this may foreshadO\\ a regeneration of German global capacity in university research. The European Commission has established a target of R&D investment of 3 per cent of GDP across all member countries and plans to establish a collaborntive super-institution. the European Institute of Teclll1ology . Other nations will f()lIow. 1110re so if China' s transition to a research-intensive economy is successful. This offers universities the prospect of Inrger research budgcts. and also intensi lied controls as governments seck to secure tangible results li'om their investment. For the world it means an 'arl11S race' in investment in innovation. an ever-growing reliance 011 the lbe of rankings, and more precisely targeted rankings technologies.
RWlkil1?,s £111£1 (i01'CI"IWI7(,C
Of all the new factors that have emerged in the last dec8de. global uni\ersity ranking;. have had a greater impact on higher education and especially research policy than an)
other. with the possible exception of II September 200 I and the liS response. For example. rankings have had a greater shapillg eHect in the strategies and priorities of higher education than the mainstreaming of concerns abollt climate change Il)lIowing the l i K Stern report. This is remarkable and it raises the analytical and political stakes in questions of interpretation. That is a longer discussion than there is room for in this chapter. which will be confined to a small number of points about rankings and gmermlllce. (There is ltlrlher discussion elsewhere: see. for example. Marginson & van der Wende. 2009b; Margillson. 2007b : Marginson. 2007c ). First. it would be misleading to see rankings as imposed on higher education in"titutions in each country from oUlside the sector. by government or business or b} the endogenous forces of global economic competition. It is true that all of these elements are in play. But global rankings are distinct from other technologies of perttmllance monitoring and management characteristic of the New Public i\lanagcment in the nco-liberal era. They did not originate in the systems of control and micro-management uSied by state agencies or large corporate bureaucracies operating at the national level. They are an explicitly global technology. their function is the ordering of global relations in higher education where there is no s!<lte or pol regime. and even their one national-system genesis in the liS ~ews eXierci~e W<lS outside government. Notwithstanding the role of the Chinese government in supporting the genesis of the Jiao Tong rankings. rankings sprang largely from civil society and higher education itself and were widely and popularly embraced belixe their endorsement and use by governments and uni\(:rsit~ managers as tools of survieillance and incentive-making.
As this chapter has dielllonstrated, global university rankings were developed by two groups of agencies operating outside the sphere of government and organisation: first. publishing companies such as US ~ews and The Times: and second. academic units like the Jiao Tong Institute and the OlE, competent in sociological research. These two sets of agencies have different purposes and techniques. Their ranking "ystems diverge. But they share a capacity to imagine and vector wide-ranging common spaces and thus to con"tru.::t a global dimension of higher education. In turn this global imaginary has lockied onto the signs of global convergence that \\ e observe more or less continuously: the accelerating tlows of students, academic personnel. l1l.::ssages, ideas. research data, policies. organisational templates, tiechnologies and money: all of which helps us to visualise global higher education as a single environment and rend.::rs 1110re credible Ihe idea of a global league tablc (gross over-simplification though it is) (Marginson & van der Wende. 2007b ). \10rie tendentiously. ranking:s imagine that global environment as a market of eOlllpeting institutions. This also connects to what many people already know. It lils with the familiar nieo-liberal conception of education as an economic market and the Anglo-American notion of globalisation as the roll out of world-wide markets. The notion of the global market gains salience from the actual commercial competition il)r international studcnts, the competitive element in research, and the long-standing status hierarchy among traditional universities. Hazelkorn .::oncludes that 'it is clear that rankings are a manifestation of the already compietitive global market in whi.::h higher education operates. and are heing used and perceived as such ' (Hazclkorn. 2008. p. 211) . That is too neat. It downplays the role of cross-border collaboration and especially free knowledge flows. The global public goods produced in higher cducation are much more significant than the global private goods (Marginson, 2007a) . But Hazelkorn is right ahout the conditions of emergence. The notion of universities as teams in a knowledge e<.:onOI11) \Vorld Cup is not the onl) way to imagine the glohal dimension of higher education. But it fits with the polie) times and has grabbed the imaginative space.
Second. notwithstanding their origins, universit) rankings quickly acllie\ ed a productive symbiosis with the New Public Management and nco-liberal political economy in higher education. in almost every nation. (Global ranking~ ha\ c little impact in the USA where the national market is seen to cmbod) thc best institutions in the world: the US News still reigns). As the meta-perf~JrI11anCe indicator. ranking, strengthen the hand of government in imposing 011 institution" a pcrfnrmance culture and a regi me of measured outcomes, and strengthen the hand llf managers in mimetically imposing these systems on academic units. as I hlzclkorn' ~ stud) indicates. No doubt neo-liberal governance provides favourable conditions ttlr ranking and ensures that the outcomes of such comparisons \vill be instantl) noticed. At the same time institutional ranking reinstalls as ideolog) ke) elcment~ of neo-liberal governance. It explicitly orders higher education as a global market of competing teams (quasi-firms), and shiHs the onus of responsihilit) for improving the quantity and quality of research and higher education fhll11 governments to institutions and so on down the chain. As with all systems b(1sed on sell:regulation. autonomy is valued and acquiescence is voluntary hut the goal pO\\er of ranking is compelling. All university league tables, national or global. position uni\er;;it) executives and researchers as self·regulating market actors. :\s "iikolas Rn~e remarks, this is 'the conduct of conduct' in which I~)rms of freedom become the medium of marketisation, and human agents are players in the ubiquitous competition games (Rose. 1999). Here global university ranking is (1 fllrm of 'global govern mentality' whereby global systems and factors. even global factors that are invented for the purpose and then take on a Ii fe of their own. arc lIsed as tools of governance at national and local levels and are selectively channelled into the slwping 01' behaviours (Lamer & Walters, 2004) .
Third, the advent of global research rankings take LIS into a space that is national and post-national at the same time. It is post-national and global in that it arranges the higher education world as a network of equivalent institutions transparent in terms of uniform criteria. like the elements that comprise physical chemistry. without regard for the particular character of each institution and the eircull1stan~es gO\ eming its performance. Research rankings are also post-national in the sense that research and knowledge flow cross borders without restraint. Although English is the one common language of research. so that research measurement nl\'ollrs the Engli<,h-speaking systems -a very significant limitation for those working in non English-speaking countries -in principle the common research conversation is oren to all.
At the same time. global rankings are also national because league tahle~ and rankings performance readily translate into comparison between nations (i.e. nil inter-national as \vell as global comparison). and not just between institutions qua institutions and between their academic disciplines. Also national im estment remains the largest inlluence on university capacity to perform, eVen in the l. SA where federal science funding is determining. Global uni,ersit} ranking. like all 3() such league tahle~ of comparative international pertixmance, speak to the role of national government at the apex of the 'glohal competition state', which is hecoming the principal way of undcrstanding the nation in this era. Except perhaps in the L!SA, the nation is 110 longer a horizon unto itsel f and increasingly is understood in terms of its position and trajectory within the glohal setting. The adoption of this outlook in China, in place of the old autarky of the Middle Kingdom, largely indifterent to the world heyond its historical horders, is a major shift.
Fourth, glohal university ranking, and the technologies of output measurement that have hecome associated with it (puhl ication counts, citation counts, journal rankings, impact measures, methods of securing equivalence across field, and so on). arc a system for assigning workahle economic values to the products of universities and to universities as institutions. Trends in a university's rank can he seen as equivalent 10 the rise and fall of corporate equity prices. where the issue is not the ahsolute level of the price hut its trajectory. up or down. The numher ora university's puhlieations. reworked according to an index of quality, can he seen as a precise indicator of the research it produced in the preceding period. Once credihle calculations are installed the numhers take on great weight (consider the power of the US News despite widespread critique of several of the measures). Exact funding can he allocated on the hasis of rankings metrics. hy governments, husiness tinns and philanthropi~t". In other words the notion ofuniversitics as competing units of production has the potential to hecome more than an ideology shaping hehaviour:_ it could hecomc an operational economic system. University research in rankings systems still falls short of the capitalist ideal. Free scientitic production placed in the puhlic domain has no prices attached to it. and it is difficult or impossihlc to ascrihe monetary value to the indirect henefits that research knowledge creates in the production process in industr). Nevertheless. the research ranking technologies constitute a signilicant step in the direction of the economisation of higher education. At the least, rankings have laid the hasis fix one !tmn of precise targeting of government investment and fi)r the ever intensifying micro-management of free puhlic knowledge goods.
Finally. glohal university ranking constitlltes 11n attempt to order the worldwide higher education environment in particular ways. On the vast open possihilities conjured up hy glohal communicahility and cultural !lows (Marginson, 2008) . it imposes an audacious closure, one that clearly assists some interests and not others. Ranking strengthens and reproduces the domination of the English language university systems. It inSl1llls the model of the top American research university (more particularly the idealised pri\ate university, the Ivy League) as the dominant template t()r higher education on a worldwide has is, even though no other nation has the glohal power or resource:, to imitate this kind of institutioll. It encourages the centralisation of research activity in fewer. stronger institutions and so directs inno\ation and the knowledge economy down restricted pathway~. As discussed. hy relegating all hut the leading science universities to a suhordinate position, it sharply hears down on diversity within and hetween nations. Because there is only one \ allied l11i"sion. this narrows the :,cope fix upward institutional mohility and especially for mould-hreaking organisational designs. There is some space for the upward mobility of institutions and systems, The governments of China. Singapore, Korea and Taiwan China are particularly interested in global ranking because this technology enables them to track the progress of their own institutions, The challengers of hegemony 011 the grounds of hegemony, these system" will face continuing tensions in national strategy between cultural identity and the processes of global modernisation.
Global university ranking is here to stay, Responding political strategic,., will have to work around it. alongside it under it and over the top of it. Ran"ing as such will not disappear. Global league tables cannot altogether block the potential fix other kinds of cross-border relations and for ttmlls of high quality institution other than the research-intensive English language university, But they pose the need to factor back in diversity (of institutional types. of languages. of knowledge. of modes of governance) and the non-competitive global exchange of people and kno\\' ledge, A key move is to pluralise eomparison itself. to move part of the action away hom the whole of institution league tables that recycle inherited reputation and resources and so preserve the global and national status quos, The CI !F'~ interactive data for student choice are one example of such pluralisatinn, The more numerous and varied the means of comparibon on offer. the better informed we wi II be and the less that anyone system of cOlllpari~on can secure enough weight to shape global rciations decisively in its own image, NOTES rhi..' \\('hSHl' t'Onlalih all or the ran~ing;-. ulltt:Ollle:-. SilK": the SC:-H.,..... hcgan 111 ml:Jlldll~g lh\..' rankll1g> P\ hroad dlS~lriJnar\ l'i~ld frol11 ~Oil7 "Imards, and a ,kwlkd ,,,planation ,,1'tl1,' l11ell1,,,I,,· logll'" thl'tL n:k~\ ..Hit flarl~rs and I inks 1('1 nlnhmgs Slit':-' \\ orld\\ H.k
